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We prove the unconditional security of the original Bennett 1992 protocol with strong reference
pulse. We show that we may place a projection onto suitably defined qubit spaces before the receiver,
which makes the analysis as simple as qubit-based protocols. Unlike the single-photon-based qubits,
the qubits identified in this scheme are almost surely detected by the receiver even after a lossy
channel. This leads to the key generation rate that is proportional to the channel transmission rate
for proper choices of experimental parameters.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an art to dis-
tribute a secret key between parties (Alice and Bob) with
arbitrary small leakage of its information to an unautho-
rized party (Eve). So far, several QKD protocols have
been proposed and experimentally demonstrated [1]. In
real life QKD, loss and noises in the quantum channel
limit the achievable distance. In order to cover longer
distances, a decoy state idea for BB84 [2] with weak co-
herent pulses was proposed, which achieves a key genera-
tion rate of order O(η) [3] in the single photon transmis-
sion rate η, whereas it is in the order of O(η2) without
decoy states [4].
Another proposal to achieve longer distances was made
in 1992 by Bennett [5] (B92). The protocol uses two
weak coherent states together with a strong reference
pulse (SRP), and is expected to be robust against channel
losses. In contrast to the decoy schemes where the robust-
ness is achieved by using an increased number of states,
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FIG. 1: (a) An experimental setup for the B92 protocol with
strong reference pulse. PM: phase modulator. (b) An equiv-
alent setup for Bob.
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the B92 protocol uses just two states, and hence its ro-
bustness should come from an entirely different mecha-
nism. Unconditional security was proved [6] for a variant
of the B92 protocol using two polarization states of a sin-
gle photon, which we call S-B92, but it does not share
the robustness expected for the original B92. The secu-
rity proof of the original B92 protocol is thus important
from the practical viewpoint as well as the fundamental
one.
In this paper, we prove the unconditional security of
the original B92 protocol, and reveal the mechanism with
which its robustness against loss arises. The crucial find-
ing is that the B92 protocol can be regarded as many
S-B92 protocols executed in parallel, which has two ben-
efits. Firstly, it allows us to use the analysis of S-B92
in proving the security of the B92 protocol. Secondly, a
striking difference from S-B92 tells us why the B92 pro-
tocol is robust against loss and performs similarly to an
ideal single-photon implementation of the BB84 protocol.
In two-state protocols, it is known that by exploit-
ing an unambiguous state discrimination (USD) measure-
ment, Eve can obtain a benefit from qubit loss events [1].
Thus, a secure key is impossible over longer distances in
S-B92 [6], where qubit loss events are directly connected
to physical channel loss. On the other hand, the qubits in
the B92 protocol turn out to be defined including a vac-
uum component in the signal mode, and they are almost
always received by Bob even after traveling over longer
distances. In other words, the qubit loss events are neg-
ligible since it is not directly connected to the physical
channel loss.
This paper is organized as follows. In Sec. II, we ex-
plain how the B92 protocol works, and in Sec. III, we
prove its security. Our security proof is based on the
conversion to an entanglement distillation protocol, and
our proof uses technique from the security proof of S-
B92. Thus, in Sec. III A, we briefly review the security
proof of S-B92 [6], then in Sec. III B, III C, and III D, we
intuitively present the security proof of the B92 protocol,
2putting some emphasis on the difference between S-B92
and the B92 protocol. We leave the technical details of
the proof to the appendices. Finally, we show some ex-
amples of the resulting key generation rate in Sec. IV,
and we summarize this paper in Sec. V.
II. B92 PROTOCOL WITH STRONG
REFERENCE PULSE
The essence of the experimental setup of the B92 pro-
tocol can be expressed by a Mach-Zehnder interferome-
ter in Fig. 1(a). Alice generates a strong coherent pulse
and splits it into a weak signal pulse |√κ〉S and an SRP
|√µ〉SRP (κ ≪ µ). After Alice applies a phase modu-
lation to prepare |(−1)i√κ〉S according to her random
bit i = 0, 1, she sends out these two systems. Bob uses a
beam splitter BS1 with reflectivity R ≡ κ/µ, which splits
the SRP into weak and strong pulses. The weak pulse
(W) and the signal pulse interfere at BS2, whose action is
represented by bˆj =
1√
2
(
aˆW + (−1)j aˆS
)
(j = 2, 3), where
bˆj and aˆW/S are annihilation operators for the spatial
mode to the detector Dj and the W/S mode, respectively.
For Bob’s part, we assume two types of detectors. One
type can tell if the photon number ν is in an interval
λ(D1) ≡ [νi, νf − 1], (1)
and the other type can discriminate among vacuum,
single-photon, and multi-photon events. We note that
one of us [7] proved the security of a modified B92 with
threshold detectors, but there Bob must lock his own lo-
cal oscillator to the SRP mode via a feed-forward control,
which may not be easy to implement. In Fig. 1(a), Bob
infers Alice’s bit value to be 0 (1) when D2 (D3) records a
single photon and D3 (D2) records no photon. Let Λfil,all
be the rate of these conclusive events. Here and hence-
forth, “rate” is always normalized by the total number
of signals. Among the conclusive events, only the cases
where the outcome of D1 is in λ
(D1) will be kept and used
to generate the final key after classical error correction
(EC) and privacy amplification (PA) [8]. Let Λfil,λ′ be
the rate of these events, where
λ′ ≡ [νi + 1, νf ] (2)
corresponds to the range of the total number of photons
recorded by the three detectors. Using random test bits,
Alice and Bob monitor the error rates Λbit,all and Λbit,λ′
of the cases where Alice’s bit and Bob’s bit are different.
Bob also monitors the rate Λvac,λ(D1) of events where both
D2 and D3 record no photon and D1 reports an outcome
in λ(D1). Note that in the normal operation with η ≪ 1
and λ(D1) being wide enough, we should have Λfil,all ∼=
Λfil,λ′ , Λbit,all ∼= Λbit,λ′ , and Λvac,λ(D1) ∼= Λvac,all ∼= 1, but
these three rates must still be monitored to watch out for
Eve’s possible attacks as we will see later.
III. SECURITY PROOF
In this section, we prove the security of the B92 proto-
col. Throughout this paper, we assume that all imperfec-
tions are controlled by Eve. Note that D1 with quantum
efficiency η1 and D2 (D3) with η
′ are equivalent to the
setup with unit-efficiency detectors when absorbers with
the transmission rate of η′ and η′′ = Rη′+ (1−R)η1 are
respectively put in S and SRP modes, and the reflectiv-
ity of BS1 is changed to Rη′/(Rη′ + (1 − R)η1). As for
dark counts, we assume Eve can induce dark counts as
she pleases. Thus, in what follows we assume that all
detectors have unit efficiency and no dark counts.
Since the B92 protocol and S-B92 share many similar-
ities, in the security proof of the B92 protocol we em-
ploy the idea from security proof of S-B92. In the next
subsection, we briefly review S-B92 security proof. It is
based on the conversion of the protocol to an entangle-
ment distillation protocol. After the review, we present
the security proof of the B92 protocol.
A. Review of B92 with single-photon
implementation
In S-B92, Alice sends out |ϕi〉 ≡ β|0x〉 + (−1)iα|1x〉
(α2 + β2 = 1 and β > α > 0) depending on randomly
chosen bit value i = 0, 1, where |0x〉 and |1x〉 repre-
sent a basis (X-basis) of the qubit states (the single-
photon polarization states). For later convenience, we
define the Z-basis as |iz〉 ≡ (|0x〉 + (−1)i|1x〉)/
√
2, and
Pˆ (|φ〉) ≡ |φ〉〈φ|. When Bob receives a qubit state, he
broadcasts this fact and continues to perform a mea-
surement described by positive-operator-valued measure
(POVM) [8]
Fˆ0 = (G/2)Pˆ (|ϕ1〉)
Fˆ1 = (G/2)Pˆ (|ϕ0〉)
Fˆnull = 1− Fˆ0 − Fˆ1 , (3)
where G = (γ/β)2, 0 < γ ≤ 1, and |ϕi〉 ≡ α|0x〉 −
(−1)iβ|1x〉 is the state orthogonal to |ϕi〉. We call mea-
surement outcomes with F0 or F1 conclusive. Bob tells
over a public channel if he has obtained the conclusive
event or not.
In order to prove the security of S-B92, in [6] S-B92
was converted to an entanglement distillation protocol
(EDP). A key point in the conversion is that Bob’s mea-
surement can be decomposed by a filtering operation [9],
whose successful operation is represented by a Kraus op-
erator [8]
Aˆs =
√
G[αPˆ (|0x〉) + βPˆ (|1x〉)] (4)
followed by Z-basis measurement. This can be seen by
noting that Fˆi = Pˆ (As|iz〉), and the successful filtering
operation corresponds to the conclusive event in S-B92.
On the other hand, we assume that Alice prepares two
3qubits in a state |Φ〉s ≡ 1√2 (|0z〉A|ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A|ϕ1〉B),
sends only qubit B to Bob, and then performs Z-basis
measurement on qubit A. In the normal operation with-
out Eve, the successful filtering operation orthogonalizes
|ϕ0〉B and |ϕ1〉B so that they share a maximally entan-
gled state, and the bit value shared by Alice and Bob via
Z-basis measurements is secure.
In the presence of loss, noise, or Eve’s intervention, Al-
ice and Bob do not share a maximally entangled state,
but if they succeed in estimating the bit and the phase er-
ror rate on the qubit pairs from which they create the key,
then they can distill an almost perfect maximally entan-
gled state by running an EDP. Here, the bit (phase) error
stands for an event where Alice and Bob have different
measurement outcomes in Z-basis (X-basis). Moreover,
if we use the argument by Shor and Preskill [10], the
EDP protocol followed by Z-basis measurements can be
made equivalent to S-B92 with EC and PA. Since the bit
error rate Λbit can be reliably estimated from test bits,
we are only left with the estimation of the upper bound
on the phase error rate Λph from the observed variables.
Thanks to the filter, we can actually relate this bound
with other observables. When the photon reaches Bob
at rate Λs and gives a conclusive outcome at rate Λfil, it
was shown in [6] that
Λfil − 2Λbit ≤ 2Gαβ g(CZ) , (5)
where g((a, b, c, d)T ) ≡
√
ad +
√
bc, Z =
(Λs,Λ1x,Λfil,Λph)
T , and the matrix C is the inverse of
C−1 =


1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
Gα2 Gβ2 Gα2 Gβ2
0 Gβ2 Gα2 0

 . (6)
The quantity Λ1x is the rate at which Bob receives the
photon and Alice’s qubit A is in state |1x〉A. Although
Λ1x is not measured in the protocol, we have a bound
α2 − 1 + Λs ≤ Λ1x ≤ α2. Using this, the bound on Λph
can be obtained by solving Eq. (5).
The key rate resulting from the above formula is
nonzero only for short distances [6]. For a high loss region
with small rate Λs, Eve may perform the USD measure-
ment on the incoming two states. Whenever it fails, she
blocks the photon as if it were lost due to the channel
loss. If the USD is successful, she can send the correct
state to Bob and hence she learns the bit value without
inducing any error. It follows that any two state protocol
is fragile against qubit loss events. Note that the qubit
loss events is not always connected directly to the physi-
cal channel losses, which is the case for the B92 protocol
as we will see.
B. Conversion of the B92 protocol into an
entanglement distillation protocol
In this subsection and the subsequent ones, we prove
the security of the B92 protocol. Especially, this subsec-
tion is devoted to a conversion of the B92 protocol into
an entanglement distillation protocol, which is the most
crucial point in our proof.
Our strategy for the proof is to apply a similar argu-
ment to the original B92 with SRP, i.e., we consider the
distillation of the maximally entangled state. For the dis-
tillation, we first have to convert Alice’s and Bob’s part
in such a way that each of them has a qubit. Then, we
consider the phase error estimation by modifying Eq. (1).
Alice’s part can easily be converted by letting her first
prepare |Ψ〉 ≡ 1√
2
(|0z〉A|
√
κ〉S + |1z〉A|−
√
κ〉S) |√µ〉SRP
and measure the qubit A on the Z basis.
On the other hand, the conversion of Bob’s part is not
straightforward since the definition of his qubit space is
by no means trivial. For the conversion, we first intro-
duce additional fictitious measurements which do not dis-
turb Bob’s conclusive data at all. Thus, the security of
the final key does not change even if we assume that Bob
has conducted these additional measurements. As we will
see, these measurements consist of a total photon num-
ber measurement (P) and a qubit projection (Q). Fur-
thermore, as we did in Sec. III A for the S-B92 protocol,
we decompose Bob’s original measurement into a filter-
ing operation (F) followed by a projection measurement
(M) (see Fig. 1(b)). Here, the qubit space is defined by
combining the vacuum state and the single-photon state
of the S-mode with the appropriate Fock states of the
SRP mode depending on the outcome of measurement P.
Our qubit space is thus defined depending on the total
photon number. This total photon number determines
the nonorthogonality in Bob’s measurement.
Now, let us present the conversion of Bob’s part in
detail. First, define |ν′, ν − ν′〉B ≡ |ν′〉S|ν − ν′〉SRP as
the state with ν′ photons and ν − ν′ photons in mode
S and SRP, respectively. Since Bob uses only linear
optics and photon detectors, it does not disturb the
statistics of Bob’s measurement outcomes to assume
that Bob’s measurement is preceded by the measurement
of the total photon number ν in modes S and SRP.
We denote this measurement as “P”, whose POVM is
{∑k+k′=ν Pˆ (|k, k′〉B)}ν=0,1,···. Suppose that ν > 0 is
obtained in this measurement, and recall that Bob’s
conclusive events occur only when D2 and D3 receive one
photon in total. Then, it follows that without any dis-
turbance of the statistics of the conclusive events, P can
be followed by projection measurement “Q” with POVM
{∑i=0,1 Pˆ (|i, ν − i〉B),∑ν′=2,3,···,ν Pˆ (|ν′, ν − ν′〉B)}.
Here, Q decides if the state is in the qubit subspace H(ν)
spanned by |0(ν)x 〉B ≡ |0, ν〉B and |1(ν)x 〉B ≡ |1, ν − 1〉B.
Under the condition that the total number of photons
was ν, let us calculate the POVM element Fˆ
(ν)
i for ob-
taining conclusive bit i. At BS1, conversion |0, ν〉B →
|0〉S|1〉W|ν − 1〉D1 occurs with probability (1−R)ν−1νR,
and |1, ν − 1〉B → |1〉S|0〉W|ν − 1〉D1 with (1 − R)ν−1.
Since outcome i corresponds to the projection to state
(|0〉S|1〉W + (−1)i|1〉S|0〉W)/
√
2, we have
Fˆ
(ν)
i = (Gν/2)Pˆ (αν |0(ν)x 〉B + (−1)iβν |1(ν)x 〉B) (7)
4with Gν ≡ (1 − R)ν−1(1 + νR), αν ≡
√
νR/(1 + νR),
and βν ≡
√
1/(1 + νR). At this point, we notice that
the measurement on each qubit space is the same as the
measurement in S-B92 with (G, β, α)→ (Gν , βν , αν), and
hence we can define the filter accordingly. The success-
ful filtering operation converts βν |0(ν)x 〉 ± αν |1(ν)x 〉 into
orthogonal states, and it is described by
Aˆ(ν)s =
√
Gν [αν Pˆ (|0(ν)x 〉) + βνPˆ (|1(ν)x 〉)] . (8)
Physically, the conversion is realized by BS1 and (ν −
1)-photon detection by D1, resulting in (|0〉S|1〉W ±
|1〉S|0〉W)/
√
2. Thus, we conclude that Bob’s measure-
ment can be decomposed into the sequence of P, Q, and
the filtering operation (F) followed by a projection mea-
surement on a qubit.
Note that in the B92 protocol we distill a key from
the successfully filtered events (or the conclusive events)
with total photon number ν ∈ λ′. Thus, by following the
argument by Shor and Preskill, we conclude that once we
have the estimation of an upper-bound on the phase error
rate with total photon number ν ∈ λ′, i.e., Λph,λ′/Λfil,λ′ ,
we complete the security proof.
C. Comparision to the single-photon
implementation
S-B92 and our B92 are similar in the sense that Bob ap-
plies a filter that orthogonalizes two nonorthogonal qubit
states. However, the two schemes differ in the structure
of the qubit spaces and the effect of optical loss (repre-
sented by channel transmission η) on them. In the S-B92
protocol, the loss of the photon means that Bob fails to
receive a qubit. On the other hand, when the photon
reaches Bob, the nonorthogonality of the two received
states is the same as that of the two states released from
Alice. Hence the initial states of Alice and the measure-
ment by Bob are described by the same parameter α.
The loss of the qubit is fatal to the key rate, since Eve is
able to let Bob receive a qubit preferentially in the cases
where she has succeeded in discriminating the states in
the USD measurement. In the B92 protocol, by contrast,
Bob almost always receives a qubit H(ν): He only fails
when ν is outside of λ′ or when Q fails the qubit pro-
jection, both of which are negligible if λ′ is chosen to be
wide enough and ηκ≪ 1. This prevents Eve from forcing
Alice and Bob to accept the events favorable to her.
The effect of the optical loss in the B92 protocol shows
up in an entirely different place. To see this, let us rewrite
Alice’s initial coherent states as |±√κ〉S = β˜|+〉S±α˜|−〉S
with
α˜2 = (1− e−2κ)/2, (9)
where |+〉S and |−〉S are a pair of orthonormal states
obtained by normalizing |√κ〉 ± |−√κ〉. Since λ′ is cen-
tered around ηµ and R is chosen such that ηµR = ηκ, we
have α2ν ∼ ηκ whereas α˜2 ∼ κ for κ ≪ 1. Hence in the
B92 protocol, the optical loss decreases the distinguisha-
bility of the two signal states sent out from Alice. Eve
can exploit this difference to obtain partial information
on the bit value, but this time she has no further free-
dom to manipulate Alice and Bob, since the qubit must
be almost always received by Bob. We may thus expect
that the key gain is still positive after the privacy ampli-
fication even for lossy quantum channels, which will be
confirmed in the subsequent sections.
Another complication in the B92 protocol is that it
looks as if we run slightly different S-B92 protocols with
parallel qubit channels, for each of which Bob has a filter
with a nonorthogonality specified by ν. Since this varia-
tion might be exploited by Eve, it is desirable to choose
λ′ to be narrow. As we have seen, on the other hand,
λ′ must be much wider than photon number fractuation
(∼ √ηµ) in the SRP. Due to this trade-off, it is expected
that the key rate also depends on the intensity µ of SRP.
D. The phase error estimation
Since the formal derivation of the upper bound of the
phase error rate is a bit complicated, in the main text we
intuitively present the derivation and we leave the formal
derivation to Appendices. From the relation to S-B92 we
have seen above, it follows that Eq. (5) holds for each
photon number ν, namely,
Λfil,ν − 2Λbit,ν ≤ 2Gνανβνg(CνZν) . (10)
Here, we have used a straightforward translation of the
parameters in S-B92 into those in the B92 protocol as
(Λfil,Λbit, G, β, α)→ (Λfil,ν ,Λbit,ν, Gν , βν , αν) (11)
and
Z = (Λs,Λ1x,Λfil,Λph)
T
→ Zν = (Λs,ν ,Λ1x,ν ,Λfil,ν ,Λph,ν)T (12)
Note that g(u) is concave and g is monotone increasing
for each element of u. Taking the summation over the
range ν ∈ λ, where
λ ≡ λ(D1) ∪ λ′ = [νi, νf ] , (13)
and noting that Gνανβν ≤ Gνfανfβνf , we have
Λfil,λ − 2Λbit,λ ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C′Zλ) (14)
with Zλ = (Λs,λ,Λ1x,λ,Λfil,λ,Λph,λ)
T and C′ ≡
maxν∈λ Cν , where the maximum is taken for each ele-
ment.
Since we have used Eq. (5) from S-B92 argument [6],
Eq. (14) holds true in the asymptotic limit in which the
block size for each photon number ν is large. As we
show in Appendix B, with a more detailed analysis using
Azuma’s inequality [11, 12], we can show that it holds
true if the total block size is large.
5Finally, we must convert Eq. (14) into one involv-
ing only the accessible quantities. As we show in Ap-
pendix B, Eqs. (B10)-(B13), Zλ is upper-bounded by
ZU ≡ (1, α˜2,Λfil,all,Λph,λ)T . A lower bound is given
by ZL ≡ (η˜λ, α˜2 − 1 + η˜λ,Λfil,λ′ ,Λph,λ)T with η˜λ ≡
Λvac,λ(D1) + Λfil,λ′. Since the vacuum events are domi-
nant in the high loss region, η˜λ is almost unity, implying
that the qubit loss events are negligible. This makes our
B92 robust against channel losses. Using these bounds,
we can rewrite Eq. (14) into
Λfil,λ′ − 2Λbit,all ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C′+ZU −C′−ZL) , (15)
where we have decomposed C′ = C′+ −C′− such that C′+
includes only the nonnegative entries of C′. An upper
bound of the phase error Λph,λ′ is determined by inserting
the experimental data into Eq. (15) and searching for
the maximum value of Λph,λ satisfying Eq. (15), since
Λph,λ′ ≤ Λph,λ by definition. The key generation rate is
given by [10]
Gkey = Max
(
0,Λfil,λ′
[
1− h
(
Λbit,λ′
Λfil,λ′
)
− h
(
Λph,λ′
Λfil,λ′
)])
,
(16)
where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1− x) log2(1− x).
IV. KEY GENERATION RATE
To illustrate the resulting key rates, we consider a
quantum channel that maps Pˆ (|±√κ〉S|√µ〉SRP) into
(1− p)Pˆ (|±√ηκ〉S|√ηµ〉SRP) + pPˆ (|1〉S|√ηµ〉SRP). Here
|1〉S is a single photon state and 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The first part
models loss with transmission rate η, and the second part
models dark counts since a single photon state causes a
random click on Bob’s detectors D2 and D3. In order to
express the experimental parameters, we define l as the
distance between Alice and Bob, ξ as a loss coefficient,
and ηBob as Bob’s detection efficiency. We take the ex-
perimental parameters from Gobby et al [13], which are
p = 1.7 × 10−6, ξ = 0.21 (db/km), and ηBob = 0.045
neglecting alignment errors. With these parameters, we
have
Λfil,all = e
−2ηκ2ηκ(1− p) + e−ηκp ,
η = 10−
ξl
10 ηBob ,
Λfil,λ′ = Λfil,all
∑
ν∈λ(D1)
Pη(µ−κ)(ν) ,
Λvac,λ(D1) = e
−2ηκ(1− p)
∑
ν∈λ(D1)
Pη(µ−κ)(ν) ,
Λbit,λ′ =
e−ηκp
2
∑
ν∈λ(D1)
Pη(µ−κ)(ν) , (17)
where Px(ν) ≡ e−x xνν! .
We have calculated the key rate Gkey and the achiev-
able distance la (km) for several choices of parameters
GLLP + Decoy
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FIG. 2: The key generation rate. See the main text for the
explanations.
(µ, κ, a), where νi = ηµ − a√ηµ, and νf = ηµ + a√ηµ.
In Fig. 2, we fix κ = 10−0.92 and a = 3.2, and vary
µ as (a) µ = 105 resulting in la = 55, (b) µ = 10
6.59
(la = 100), and (c) µ = 10
10 (la = 122). This con-
firms our earlier speculation that increasing µ will restrict
Eve’s options and leads to a better key rate. The slope
of curve (c) shows that the key rate is proportional to
the channel transmission η until the distance approaches
la. Increasing µ further beyond (c) merely results in
saturation at la = 124, and this is the maximum dis-
tance among the combinations of the parameter set that
we have tried. We can also trade the intensity of SRP
for a poor resolution a. For example, with µ = 107 we
can still achieve la = 100 even with a relative resolution
|λ(D1)|/ηµ ∼ 10%.
To see how accurate our phase estimation is, we plot
Gkey (dashed line) based on the actual phase error rate
induced by the quantum channel. The curve is almost
identical for (a), (b) and (c), implying that the key rate
dependence on µ is due to the difference in the estimation
ability. This is a typical feature of the B92 protocol in
which the phase error rate cannot be estimated directly
as opposed to the BB84 protocol. We must also note that
the derivation of Eq. (15) from Eq. (5) is not tight and the
estimation might be improved by a more sophisticated
analysis.
For comparison, we have also shown the key rate for the
BB84 protocol based on the GLLP formula [14] (dotted
line, la = 51), and the rate with infinite number of de-
coy states [3] (dotted line, la = 163), assuming the ideal
error correction efficiency. Considering that the analysis
of the statistical fluctuations in the decoy schemes tends
to be very complicated [3], achieving a comparably long
distance with just two states could be an advantage of
the B92 protocol in practical implementations.
V. SUMMARY
In summary, we studied the security of the original
B92 with strong reference pulse assuming the two types
of detectors. We can identify qubit spaces composed of
the states with the signal pulse including zero and one
6photon. It follows that even if the transmission channel
is physically very lossy, Bob still finds a qubit state with
high probability, which is the essential difference from
the single-photon B92. We showed the key rate scales
as Gkey ∼ O(η) when the SRP is strong enough. It is
interesting to remove the assumptions on the detectors,
which we leave for future studies.
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APPENDIX A: AZUMA’S INEQUALITY
In the following appendices, we explain the formal
derivation of the phase error estimation, Eq. (15). As
we have mentioned in the main text, we need to obtain
the relationship among Λbit,λ, Λfil,λ, Λph,λ, Λ1x,λ, and
Λs,λ. For the derivation of the relationship, we have two
problems to be addressed. First, note that these ratios
cannot be directly measured in the experiment. For in-
stance, in the actual experiment we have direct access to
Λfil,λ′ , not Λfil,λ. Thus, Λfil,λ has to be estimated via ac-
tually available experimental data. This is also the case
for other ratios, such as Λbit,λ, Λ1x,λ, and Λs,λ, and the
estimation will be discussed in Appendix C.
In addition to this problem, we have another difficulty
in deriving the relationship. The difficulty lies in the fact
that not all the observables can be simultaneously mea-
sured. For example, Λ1x,λ and Λbit,λ do not commute
because Alice has to conduct X-basis measurement for
Λ1x,λ while she performs Z-basis measurement for Λbit,λ.
In order to overcome this problem, we randomly label
each pair as a test pair (with a small probability t) or a
code pair (with probability 1 − t) [15]. We try to distill
a key from the code pairs, and hence what we need to
estimate is the phase error rate Λph,λ in the code pairs.
By using the Bell measurement [16], Λbit,λ and Λph,λ in
the code pairs can be measured simultaneously, in prin-
ciple. On the other hand, for the test pairs, we assume
that Alice performs X-basis measurement on her qubits
to measure Λ1x,λ. In this way, all the observables can be
measured simultaneously, and we can clearly define joint
probabilities. This is where Azuma’s inequality, which
connects conditional probabilities with the actual ratios,
comes into our game.
P Q
s
XA 0
BfilF
fail
ph. bit
bit
x
N
code
P Q   N
  Ntest
ph
none
1x
0x
1x
  s
  s
FIG. 3: The measurement diagram.
In order to claim that the above fictitious senario is
possible in principle, the actual protocol must be slightly
modified. The labeling of test pairs and code pairs should
be publicly done in the actual protocol. The key is dis-
tilled only from the code pairs, while Alice discards her
bit values for the test pairs, such that she could have
performed X-basis measurement on her fictitious qubits.
The only parameters we actually need to monitor for the
test pairs is the number of events where zero or one pho-
ton are recorded byD2 andD3 in total, with the outcome
of D1 being in the valid range λD1 . This quantity is used
in Eq. (C5) below.
Now let us describe our argument for the phase er-
ror estimation precisely. Imagine a sequence of measure-
ments on a pair of systems, A and (S,SRP), which Alice
and Bob share (see also Fig. 3). At the beginning, Al-
ice randomly decides whether a pair is a test pairs (with
probability t) or a code pairs (with probability 1−t), and
for the code pair, the sequence of measurements starts
with “P” with outcome ν, followed by projection “Q”. If
P fails to detect photon number inside λ or Q does not
succeed in projecting the state to the qubit state H(ν),
we call such outcome as “N”. If the state was found in the
qubit state with P detecting photon number inside λ (we
call this outcome “s”), we subject the state to the filter-
ing operation F. If F succeeds (“fil”), we apply the Bell
measurement [8] (“B”) to see whether there is a bit error
(“bit”) and/or a phase error (“ph”). If F fails (“fail”),
we simply discard it.
On the other hand, for the test pairs Alice performsX-
basis measurement on HA, and Bob conducts the afore-
mentioned “P” measurement and the projection “Q”. As
a result, we have four possible outcomes, 0x ∧ s, 1x ∧ s,
0x ∧N, and 1x ∧N.
Consider N such pairs of systems, and imagine that
we repeat this set of measurements from the 1st pair in
order. Let ξ(k) be the path that was actually taken by
the kth pair. For Ω ∈ {bit, ph, fil, 1x ∧ s, s}, define Υ(l)Ω,ν
as the number of the pairs whose path include {Ω, ν}
among the first l pairs. Furthermore, we define Υ
(l)
Ω,λ as∑
ν∈λΥ
(l)
Ω,ν , and specifically we write ΥΩ,λ ≡ Υ(N)Ω,λ . With
7these parameters, we define
ΛΩ,λ ≡ ΥΩ,λ
N(1− t) for Ω = s, fil, ph, bit
ΛΩ,λ ≡ ΥΩ,λ
Nt
for Ω = 1x ∧ s . (A1)
Our task is to derive a bound on Λph,λ as a func-
tion of other ΛΩ,λ’s that can be estimated from the
data available in the actual protocol. To do so, we
invoke the fact that we can assign a joint probability
Ppath({ξ(k)}k=1,...N ) for every attack by Eve, since all
{ξ(k)} can be measured at the same time. Then, we
can apply a known classical theorem to Ppath. From
Ppath, define conditional probability ς
(l)
Ω,ν for ξ
(l) to in-
clude {Ω, ν} conditioned on {ξ(k)}k=1,...,l−1, and espe-
cially we define ς
(l)
Ω,λ ≡
∑
ν∈λ ς
(l)
Ω,ν and ςΩ,λ ≡ ς(N)Ω,λ . Fur-
thermore, we introduce nΩ,ν as follows
nΩ,λ ≡ ςΩ,λ
1− t for Ω = s, fil, bit, ph
nΩ,λ ≡ ςΩ,λ
t
for Ω = 1x ∧ s , (A2)
where nΩ,λ ≡
∑
ν∈λ nΩ,ν . Then, Azuma’s inequality [11]
states that, since X
(l)
Ω,λ ≡ Υ(l)Ω,λ−
∑l
k=1 ς
(k)
Ω,λ is martingale
[17] and satisfies the bounded difference condition [18], it
follows that for any ǫ > 0 and N > 0,
Prob
(
|ΥΩ,λ −
N∑
l=1
ς
(l)
Ω,λ| > Nǫ
)
≤ 2e−Nǫ
2
2 (A3)
holds [12] for Ω = s, fil, ph, bit, 1x ∧ s.
Then, for the code pairs, by setting ǫ in Eq. (A3) as
ǫ(1− t), we have
Prob
(
|ΛΩ,λ −
N∑
l=1
n
(l)
Ω,λ/N | > ǫ
)
≤ 2e−N(1−t)
2ǫ2
2 , (A4)
where Ω = s, fil, ph, bit, and similarly for the test pairs
we have
Prob
(
|ΛΩ,λ −
N∑
l=1
n
(l)
Ω,λ/N | > ǫ
)
≤ 2e−Nt
2ǫ2
2 , (A5)
where Ω = 1x∧s. These inequalities guarantee that in the
limit of large N with t being fixed, the normalized ver-
sion of the sum of the probabilities n
(l)
Ω,λ/N differs from
the actual ratio only with exponentially small probabil-
ity. The next step is to find the relationship among the
probabilities n
(l)
Ω,λ so that we have the relationship among
the number of the actual events.
Let ρˆ(l) be the density operator of the lth pair condi-
tioned on the previous outcomes {ξ(k)}k=1,...,l−1. Then
n
(l)
Ω,λ can be expressed as n
(l)
Ω,λ = Tr
(
ρˆ(l)FˆΩ,λ
)
, where
POVM element FˆΩ,λ ≡
∑
ν∈λ FˆΩ,ν is defined as follows.
Fˆs,ν ≡ 1ˆA ⊗ 1ˆ(ν)B
Fˆ1x∧s,ν ≡ P (|1x〉A)⊗ 1ˆ(ν)B
Fˆfil,ν ≡ 1ˆA ⊗ Aˆ(ν)†s Aˆ(ν)s
Fˆbit,ν ≡ Pˆ (|0z〉A)⊗ Fˆ (ν)1 + Pˆ (|1z〉A)⊗ Fˆ (ν)0
Fˆph,ν ≡ Pˆ (|0x〉A)⊗ Pˆ (Aˆ(ν)†s |1(ν)x 〉B)
+ Pˆ (|1x〉A)⊗ Pˆ (Aˆ(ν)†s |0(ν)x 〉B) . (A6)
Here, 1ˆA ≡ Pˆ (|0z〉A) + Pˆ (|1z〉A), 1ˆ(ν)B ≡ Pˆ (|0(ν)z 〉B) +
Pˆ (|1(ν)z 〉B), and see Eqs. (7) and (8) for the definitions of
Fˆ
(ν)
i and Aˆ
(ν)
s , respectively.
Having ρˆ(l) and FˆΩ,λ, now we can write down n
(l)
Ω,λ =
Tr(ρˆ(l)FˆΩ,λ) by using the corresponding POVM element
FˆΩ,λ. We have little clue about the identity of ρˆ
(l), but we
may find a relation f({n(l)Ω,λ}Ω) ≤ 0 which holds for any
state ρˆ(l). If we find such a convex function f , it follows
that f({∑Nl=1 n(l)Ω,λ/N}Ω) ≤ 0, and we obtain a relation
among {ΛΩ,λ} through Azuma’s inequality. Note that
in the limit of N → ∞, the above relation is simply
f({ΛΩ,λ}Ω) ≤ 0.
Thus, the derivation of the relation among the condi-
tional probabilities is the key point in deriving the in-
equality for the phase error estimation, which we present
in Appendix B.
APPENDIX B: DETAILED CALCULATIONS FOR
THE PHASE ERROR ESTIMATION
In this appendix, we derive the relation among the
conditional probabilities n
(l)
Ω,λ = Tr
(
ρˆ(l)FˆΩ,λ
)
. In what
follows, we assume ν < 1/R (R is the reflectivity of the
beam splitter BS1) and νf ≤ −12 ln(1−R) . We note that
in the actual experiment, these assumptions are well-
justified, and even if these assumptions do not hold, we
can construct the relationship by applying slight modi-
fications. Thus, these assumptions are not essential for
the proof.
Since the relationship we derive in this appendix
holds for any density matrix, we use the abbrevia-
tion nΩ,λ = Tr
(
ρˆFˆΩ,λ
)
, where ρ is any density op-
erator. Let us introduce mii′,ν and nii′,ν (i, i
′ =
0, 1) as Tr
(
ρˆPˆ (|Γ(ν)ii′ 〉AB)
)
and Tr
(
ρˆPˆ (|ix〉A|i′(ν)x 〉B)
)
,
respectively. Here, |Γ(ν)ii′ 〉AB ≡ (−1)ii
′
βν |ix〉A|i′(ν)x 〉B +
(−1)i(i′+1)αν |(i + 1)x〉A|(i′ + 1)(ν)x 〉B) (the summation
and multiplication are taken in modulo 2).
If we regard the subspace
spanned by {|0x〉A|0(ν)x 〉B, |1x〉A|1(ν)x 〉B}
({|0x〉A|1(ν)x 〉B, |1x〉A|0(ν)x 〉B}) as a qubit, then
the two bases, {|0x〉A|0(ν)x 〉B, |1x〉A|1(ν)x 〉B} and
8{|Γ(ν)00 〉AB, |Γ(ν)11 〉AB}, correspond to two directions
in the Bloch sphere with relative angle θ(ν) satisfying
α2ν = sin
2 θ(ν), and β2ν = cos
2 θ(ν) in [0, π/2]. Then, for
any qubit state in the Bloch sphere, we have
sin2(θ
(ν)
0 − θ(ν)) ≤ sin2 φ(ν)0 ≤ sin2(θ(ν)0 + θ(ν)) ,
(B1)
where n11,ν/(n11,ν+n00,ν) = sin
2 θ
(ν)
0 andm11,ν/(m11,ν+
m00,ν) = sin
2 φ
(ν)
0 . Similarly we have
sin2(θ
(ν)
1 − θ(ν)) ≤ sin2 φ(ν)1 ≤ sin2(θ(ν)1 + θ(ν)) ,
(B2)
where n01,ν/(n01,ν+n10,ν) = sin
2 θ
(ν)
1 andm01,ν/(m01,ν+
m10,ν) = sin
2 φ
(ν)
1 .
In addition, nΩ,ν can be expressed as
ns,ν =
∑
i,i′=0,1
nii′,ν (B3)
n1x∧s,ν = (n10,ν + n11,ν) (B4)
nfil,ν = Gν [α
2
ν(n00,ν + n10,ν
+ β2ν(n01,ν + n11,ν)] (B5)
nph,ν = Gν
(
α2νn10,ν + β
2
νn01,ν
)
(B6)
nbit,ν =
Gν
2
(m11,ν +m01,ν) . (B7)
Note that Eqs. (B3)-(B6) can be represented as
Zν ≡


ns,ν
n1x∧s,ν
nfil,ν
nph,ν

 = C−1ν


n00,ν
n01,ν
n10,ν
n11,ν

 , (B8)
where
C−1ν =


1 1 1 1
0 0 1 1
Gνα
2
ν Gνβ
2
ν Gνα
2
ν Gνβ
2
ν
0 Gνβ
2
ν Gνα
2
ν 0

 . (B9)
By solving Eqs. (B7), (B1), and (B8), we have an
inequality
nfil,ν − 2nbit,ν ≤ 2Gνανβνg(CνZν) .
(B10)
Here, g((a, b, c, d)T ) ≡ √ad+√bc and Cν is given by
Cν =


β4ν
(β2ν−α2ν) −β
2
ν − α
2
ν
Gν(β2ν−α2ν) −
1
Gν
− α4ν(β2ν−α2ν) −α
2
ν
α2ν
Gν(β2ν−α2ν)
1
Gν
α2νβ
2
ν
(β2ν−α2ν) β
2
ν − β
2
ν
Gν(β2ν−α2ν)
1
Gν
− α2νβ2ν(β2ν−α2ν) α
2
ν
β2ν
Gν(β2ν−α2ν) −
1
Gν

 . (B11)
We can overestimate CνZν by maximizing each entry
of Cν over ν ∈ λ = [νi, νf ] to obtain C′ ≡ maxν∈λCν as
C′ =


β4νf
(β2
νf
−α2
νf
)
−β2νf − α
2
νi
Gνi(β2νi−α2νi)
− 1Gνi
− α4νi
(β2
νi
−α2
νi
)
−α2νi
α2νf
Gνf(β2νf−α2νf )
1
Gνf
α2νfβ
2
νf
(β2
νf
−α2
νf
)
β2νi − β
2
νi
Gνi(β2νi−α2νi)
1
Gνf
− α2νiβ2νi
(β2
νi
−α2
νi
)
α2νf
β2νf
Gνf(β2νf−α2νf )
− 1Gνi


.
(B12)
Here, we have used the assumption that we choose λ
such that β2ν > α
2
ν , i.e., νR < 1, for any ν ∈ λ, lead-
ing to ∂νβ
2
ν ≤ 0, ∂να2ν ≥ 0, ∂νGν ≤ 0, ∂ν α
4
ν
(β2ν−α2ν) ≥
0, ∂ν
β4ν
(β2ν−α2ν) ≥ 0, ∂ν
α2νβ
2
ν
(β2ν−α2ν) ≥ 0, ∂ν
α2ν
(β2ν−α2ν) ≥ 0,
and ∂ν
β2ν
(β2ν−α2ν) ≥ 0. Furthermore, the condition νf ≤−1
2 ln(1−R) gives us ∂νGνανβν ≥ 0, and with the help of
this inequality, we can slightly modify Eq. (B9) as
nfil,ν − 2nbit,ν ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C′Zν) . (B13)
Note that if νR < 1 and νf ≤ −12 ln(1−R) do not hold, it
just changes the sign of the derivative functions. Thus,
even in that case, we can construct a matrix similar to
Eq. (B12) by applying appropriate modifications, such
as the interchange of νi and νf . Another remark is on
our assumption νf <
1
R and νf ≤ − 12 ln(1−R) . Note that
when R ≪ 1, this condition is approximately equivalent
to 12R =
µ
2κ ∼ 10µ ≫ νf , which is natural for standard
experiments where Bob almost never detects the photon
number that is greater than the mean photon number
emitted by Alice due to the channel loss and non-unit
quantum efficiency of the detectors. Thus, in most of
normal experiments, the assumptions hold.
Finally, we take summation over ν ∈ λ, and with the
help of the concavity of the function g((a, b, c, d)T ), we
have
nfil,λ − 2nbit,λ
≤ 2Gνfανfβνf
∑
ν∈λ
g(C′zν)
≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C′
∑
ν∈λ
zν)
= 2Gνfανfβνf g(C
′
zλ) , (B14)
where
zλ =


ns,λ
n1x∧s,λ
nfil,λ
nph,λ

 . (B15)
9APPENDIX C: ESTIMATION OF THE
PARAMETERS FROM THE EXPERIMENTALLY
AVAILABLE DATA
In this appendix, we first express Eq. (B14) in terms
of the actual number of ratio, and then we give the esti-
mation of the parameters appearing in the resulting in-
equality to obtain Eq. (15). First, we apply Azuma’s
inequality to zλ. In the limit of large N , zλ is trans-
formed into the actual ratio of the corresponding events
Z
T
λ ≡ (Λs,λ,Λ1x∧s,λ,Λfil,λ,Λph,λ)T , and we have
Λfil,λ − 2Λbit,λ ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C′Zλ) , (C1)
whereas for finite N , we can bound the probability of
violating (a slightly relaxed version of) Eq. (C1) using
Eq. (A4) and Eq. (A5).
The next step is to give the estimation of the vari-
ables appearing in Eq. (C1) from the actually observed
quantities in the experiment. By considering an inclusion
relation on λ, Λfil,λ can obviously be bounded as
Λfil,λ′ ≤ Λfil,λ ≤ Λfil,all
(C2)
where we have used λ′ ∈ λ (see Eq. (13)). Similarly,
Λbit,λ is bounded as
Λbit,λ′ ≤ Λbit,λ ≤ Λbit,all , (C3)
where we have defined Λbit,all as the number of the bit
errors divided by N(1 − t) and Λbit,λ′ as that of the bit
errors divided by N(1− t) with the condition ν ∈ λ′.
Next, note that Λs,λ is the ratio of events of the suc-
cessful qubit projection with the total photon number in-
side λ. This ratio is lower-bounded by the ratio of event
Λvac,λ(D1) where D1 detects photons inside λ
(D1) and the
vacuum is detected by D2 and D3 in total, plus the ratio
of event Λfil,λ′ where D1 detects photons inside λ
(D1) and
a single-photon is detected by D2 and D3 in total. Thus,
we have
η˜λ ≡ Λvac,λ(D1) + Λfil,λ′ ≤ Λs,λ ≤ 1 .
(C4)
Finally, Λ1x∧s,λ is obviously upper-bounded by Λ1x
that is the ratio for Alice to obtain 1x in the test pairs.
On the other hand, Λ1x∧s,λ is lower-bounded from the
worst case scenario where Alice’s X-basis measurement
results in 1 for all the pairs that have resulted in Bob’s
“N”. The ratio of this event is represented by 1 − Λ(t)s,λ,
where Λ
(t)
s,λ is the test-pair-version of Λs,λ. By the same
token as Eq. (C4), 1−Λ(t)s,λ is no larger than 1− η˜(t)λ where
η˜
(t)
λ ≡ Λ(t)vac,λ(D1) + Λ
(t)
fil,λ′ (C5)
is the test-pair-version of η˜λ, and Λ
(t)
vac,λ(D1)
and Λ
(t)
fil,λ′ are
the test-pair-version of Λvac,λ(D1) and Λfil,λ′ , respectively.
Hence, we have
Λ1x − (1− η˜(t)λ ) ≤ Λ1x∧s,λ ≤ Λ1x . (C6)
Moreover, by applying the substitutions ΛΩ,λ → Λ1x and
n
(l)
Ω,λ → α˜2 to Eq. (A5), we have
Prob
(|Λ1x − α˜2| > ǫ) ≤ 2e−N(tǫ)2/2 (C7)
for any N > 0 and ǫ > 0 (see Eq. (9) for the definition
of α˜). Thus, we can bound Λ1x∧s,λ by using the experi-
mentally available data as
α˜2 − (1− η˜(t)λ ) ≤ Λ1x∧s,λ ≤ α˜2 , (C8)
which is violated with probability less than 2e−N(tǫ)
2/2.
In summary, we have ZL ≤ Zλ ≤ ZU , where
ZL ≡ (η˜λ, α˜2 − 1 + η˜(t)λ ,Λfil,λ′ ,Λph,λ)T and ZU ≡
(1, α˜2,Λfil,all,Λph,λ)
T , and the final expression is de-
scribed as
Λfil,λ′−2Λbit,all ≤ 2Gνfανfβνf g(C′+ZU −C′−ZL) , (C9)
where we have decomposed C′ = C′+ −C′− such that C′+
includes only the nonnegative entries of C′. We remark
that Eq. (C9) uses two parameters η˜
(t)
λ and η˜λ, whereas
Eq. (15) uses only η˜λ. Since η˜
(t)
λ and η˜λ are the same pa-
rameter in different random samples, they must be very
close to each other for large N . Hence it is also possible
to measure only η˜λ in the code pairs and estimate η˜
(t)
λ
from that. But in practice, there is no additional over-
head in determining η˜
(t)
λ , and thus it is always better to
use Eq. (C9) involving fewer numbers of estimations.
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(s)
Ω,λ, X
(s−1)
Ω,λ , · · · , X
(0)
Ω,λ]
= E[ξ
(s+1)
Ω,λ |X
(s)
Ω,λ, X
(s−1)
Ω,λ , · · · , X
(0)
Ω,λ]
− E[ς
(s+1)
Ω,λ |X
(s)
Ω,λ, X
(s−1)
Ω,λ , · · · , X
(0)
Ω,λ]
+ E[X
(s)
Ω,λ|X
(s)
Ω,λ, X
(s−1)
Ω,λ , · · · , X
(0)
Ω,λ]
= ς
(s+1)
Ω,λ − ς
(s+1)
Ω,λ +X
(s)
Ω,λ
= X
(s)
Ω,λ .
[18] A sequence of random variables X(0), X(1), ..., X(s) is
said to satisfy the bounded difference condition (BDC) if
|X(s) − X(s−1)| ≤ cs holds for any s and positive cs. In
our case, it is obvious that |X
(s)
Ω,λ −X
(s−1)
Ω,λ | ≤ 1.
